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ANNUAL RE?ORT
OI{ TTIE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COMMITNITY
rHE CoUNCTL 0F THE EUR0PEAN Co}n{UNITTES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community;
Having regard to Council Decision tto 74\2O/EEC (f) of 18 February L974 on
the attainment of a high degree of convergence of the economic piblicies of
the Mernber States of the European Economic Communityl and in particular Arti-cle
4 thereof;
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission;
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament;
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committeet
.HEREBY ADOPTS TI{TS AI{NUAL REPORT 0N TI{E ECoNOMIC SIfUATICI[ IN rHE Co]O{UNTTY,
AND LAYS DOIdN FOR 19?6 ffiE GIJIDELINES TO BE FOLLOI,{ED 3Y EACH I\M{BER STATE IN
ITS ECONOMIC POLTCY:
. (1) oJ No L 63, 5.i.r974., p. 15.
*1-
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FONEWOND
Under Article 4 of its Decision dated' tr'ebruary IB 1974'
concerning the realisation of a high d.egree of convergence in the
econonic policies of the Mennber States of the European Economic Cornmu-
nity, the Cor:ncil, acti-ng on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliarnent and. the Econonic and. Social Conroitteet/r \
must, at the end of the third quarter\'/, ad.opt an annual report on the
economic situation in the Cornmr:nity and must set economic policy guid.e-
lines to be followed by the Menber States in the fol}owing f,P:'T. 0nce
the report has been adopted by the Council, the goverranents nust bring
it to the attention of their national Parlianoents so that it ray be
taken into account in budget d.ebates.
flhe guid"elines contained in this report rnay have to be ad.justed.
to take account of the trend. of econonic development when the Coru:cil
capies out its subsequent e:caninations of the economic situation.
(f) fne Conmission has laid before the CounciL proposed. amendments to
this timetable postponing the clead.line until the fourth quarter(see proposal for a CounciL Decision presented. by the Comnission
on 2J Jul_y 1975, Official_ Journal of the European Conmr.rnities,
No C 218, 2d SePtember 1975, P.2).
b
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I. TID SCALE 0F TIG RECESSIOIi IN 1q7 I
1.1 Since the middle of last year anC more particularly in the fj-rst
half of 197ir the l'[ember States ha,ve gone through the severest recession since
Dxcept i-one1
.t^-ii ^r- -- the war. Ttre coniunctural situation has been characterised by falling demanducp!r1 u
the reces- and prod-uction, a 1ow rate of capacity utili-zation , an increase i.n qnemplol,rnent,
s ion andr adspite some success in ccmbating inflation, a continuing rise in ccnsimer
' pricesr stil"1 vr'ith rnarked- d-iscrepancies between one countrv and another.
e d-ownswing whi_ch startel in Gerne,ny and lta1y, spread, to the Benelux
cor.urtries and a litt1e later also reached- France. Final1y, econcnLic activity
in the United- Kingrlom, following efforts rnad.e tc nake up grourrd lost as a
Sigrrs that result of the strikes in 1974, stearlil;r lost rnolientum. In the midrLte of l97';rthe dol'nswi.ng.
i.s ccmin* "industrial prtld'rction had reverted in nrost l4enber States to its 1eve1 at the
tc an enl beginninSr3f I97?. For the Ccnnrrnity on average, it had dropped t1r some 12-i;;,6
in a, year\t/. 
- 
Hcwever j-n. several mer,rber corurtries the d.or^rnward phase cf the
recession seens to have enCed anrf the economic climate to have teeun t: imorove.
1.2 In the auttunn cf I)1L, when the previous repcrt cn thc econ:mic
sit';atioir in the Cormr,ulity(2) l*" being prepa.red., thenuch more op'bj-mistic fore-
cast nracie fcr the economic situation. in I97j sti11 appeared plausible, Cespite
thc lcq.- inpcsed" on the resorces of member courtries by the guad.rupling of
the oi1 price. The nrain reason why this forecast provecl wrong was that it
uriCerest inrated the follor,'ine factors :
- 
the e::tent to which the eners/ crisis, inflation and. corrnter-inflationar-r'
policles wou1d. aggravate the recession and. entail adjustments;
Earlier
'urrder-esti- 
- 
the inlx"ct of these effects 
- 
ancl of their mutual reinforcement 
- 
on
mation of
"""u""ior-"y 
world trader ancl the resulting fa]l in external d.enand.l
trend.s
- the extent of tl:e n:n-down of stocks and the cautiousness of consumets as well as
investors.
(1) See 'ib,ble 1 arinexed
(2) See the Aru:ual Report on the Eccnomic Si-tuation in the Ccru.ilrrity,Official Jourrsl of the Ji_u':;pean Comr.u:riti_es, No C I49, ZB Ncvember
1914, p. r.
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L.3 For the first time eince the war, the volume of world trade will
fall in 19?I (by J-5 /o a* an annuaL rate). Ttre narkecl contraction in world
tracle reflects the scaLe of the recession, which, beginning in the United
Stateg and- Japan, has spreail to all the inilustrialized countri-es and the
non-o,il cl.eveLoping countriee. Between the second half of last year and the
first hal-f of this, the d.ecline i.n econornic acti.vity 1ed, for the Communityt
to a red.uction of about 20 y'" ty votume in the export iternand generated by
the inclustria]ized. countries. this reduction was not offset by the conti-
nuing growth of impor.ts by the OPEC countries (estimatect at 45 /" in vol-gme
terus in L97il, In fact at present these cogntries account for only about
I0 /, of the Connunityrs erports to third countries.
1.4 In 1)lJ, the ctecline in erport d-enand will mean for the various Merober
States a falI in tbe volume of 
.ggpg!g, cornpared with 19?4 ranging frcn 4 f"
(Unitea Kingdom) to Il /" (Oennany); only ltaly will nore*or-1ess succeed in
h.otding its ex1)orts to the same 1eve1 in real terus. The forecasts nade in
the autu-m of 19'14 suggested that the trend would be norrral or nearLy so, but
in fact Menber Statesr e:qports in 1975 probably have contracted apprecj"ably.
Ttre resulting shortfall in deroand wi-ll anount to between 3 and ! /o of gross
il-omestic prcduct tor I975.
Intra-comnunity trade has cleclined even more than export d"ernand
generated by third countries taken as a whole.
f.5 Inports of rnernber countries have in general d"eclined rnore sharply
than exports. At the same time, the terms of trade ha.ve improvedr particularly
as raw naterial prices ha,ve cieclined-.
Except in the case of the united Kingdom, the heavy curnent account
deficit run by Corununity countries tn l-9'i4 wi.Il probably be wc,rlte,l riLrrm tc
very r1odest levels in 19?5. The Comnuni.tyrs cunent account will show a slight
t/r \
surplus\'/, despite the fact that the Gernan surplus wj-11 contract by more
tha.n ha,lf (by sorne DM 10 OOO urillion). Considelable progress has therefore
(f) See Ib,ble 2 annexed.
5Inf ect i.ous-
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been made Ln I97) in restoring external eqLr.i.1i-brium in the Coru.:'.mitr'. The
improvernent in the Coruriunityrs cu.rrent balance has been essentially due to
the unexpected severity of the recession and. the resultant red.uction i.n
imports. Financing the deficits ha.s been less burdensome than was forecast.
As trade and financial i-nterd-epend.ence between the i-ndustrialized
countries and, in particular, the Comrrr:ni.t,v countries has become far stronger,
economic d-isruption (inflation and deflati-onary or reflationar]' movements)
occurring in one countr-:i |tcontaminatesrt the partner countries more rapicil1,'
than in the past and, given the multipli.er effect, attacks once ap,in the
countrlr in vthich Lt originateC. These nultiplier effects were particularly
powerful r'rhen the world recessicn started in 1!l_r and I9I 4. Studies carrie4
out at interrp.tional_ Ievel have shown that an reduct i-on of I :i in the
rate of growth of d.omestic d"emand i*TfirSfintustrialized countries will have
on agsresate dena,nd. /r\d.ouble this impact/in f,he Comrnunit:r countries\'/. 'l-llis estimate d,:es n:t
allow for effects being transmitted by mechanisms other than trade flows. for
instance monetary relations anC capital and labour movements. fhe ccnclrr.sion
to be dravm for economic polic;g purpofJes is that national measures tc combat
inflation or the econonic recession taken in isolation are bor_rncl t: be lini_ted
in their effects.
1.7 Despite reflationary pxcgraromes introduced in al_most alI the l;ieriber
Statesr signs of recover)r in fi-na1 domestic d.ernand. remalned sporadic ti11 the
auturnn. Private-sector investnent expend-iture is stj.1I fa11ing, although i-r:
some l'lember States consid.erable incentives have been provid.eL for investment.
The rlain causes of the decline in the propensit;r to i.nvest are the extremely
1ow capacity uti-lization rates i.n industry (about l)/"), the rerentless rise
in costs due to losses in productivi-ty, whj"ch leaves firms in a verJr weak profit
posi.tionr and also the uncertainty with rep,rd- to the economi-c outlook. Likervise,
investrnent in the housing sector is very sluggish in certain menber countries
and the stock of unscld d-v;el1ings ramains high. Public-sector capital e:,pendi-
ture is the on1;r investment component which, since the mi,1d.le of the year,
(f) Tire multiplier is believed. to be higher
countries, Dennark anC Ireland and lower
tllan 2 for the Benelux
than 2 for France and Ttal.y.
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Seems tc be on an upward couT'.e, boosted by central gQvernment investment
progranunes.
The impact of stock reductions on the trenl of activit:r in 1!l':' goes
far tc account fcr the d.ecline in industrial output. In some coruetries
and some inJustries not a1l- the involuntarl'/ glgb of finished prod'-rcts have
.ret been lisposed of. The process rna;r v"'e11 be now complete in stme cases as
rega,rd.s re,vr materials and intermediate gooCs.
Private consurrption erpenditure has increasecl on11- vreakl;y in real
terms. In some }lember States it has actually fallen. the grorth cf d.isposable
incoraes has slaclcened- as a result of cuts in the number of hours worked anC
the slolvd-or^rn in the upverd novement of vlages and salaries. At the sarne timet
the insecurit.v of the emplopnent situation and a desire to reestablish the reaL
velue of sa-vings have caused an unusually rapid increase in the propenslty to
save.
Purchases of consu:ner durables and clothing have been particularly
affected b1.'the v;eakness cf denrand; expend-i-ture on tcurism, on the other hanrl,
haS not diminishe,f. In recent rnonths, sales of new cars have recoverecl in
)enr-,p.rk ancl the Benelu:: countries and especially in Gennany.
Onl;.' central goverrunent current expenditure is continlling to gr:w'
1.9 The deterioration in the labour rnarket sj.tuaticn has taken on alarming
proportions. In all tiie mernber ccuretries 19'71 will see a sharp fall in
ernplc1.e es. In the Cornnunity as a r,Ihole, the unemplo,fed totalled al-most j million
in Augrrst 197), which, after seasonal adjustment, represents more fhan fti/" of
the worki-ng population, and is about 2 million up on the August 1974 total(l).
Short.-tirne working is spreading in rnost of the }.iiember States, in particular
France ancl ltaly, less overtime is being worked, and the number of unfilled
lacanci.es has cropped. Since the end of the holiday period, there have beent
in some member colntries, some weak signs that unenploJ.Ttent rnight be Ieve11ing
off, but rvith the arrival on the labour nrarket of schcol--leaversr a further
deterioration in the situation is to be fea,red. fn an attenpt to ne.intain the
level of emplo]rynent in construction, maqy I'{ember States have ad,opted measures
which could prevent a fresh dol'rnturn in this sector'
(1) See Table I arinexed
1
I
1.10 As a result of the anti-.-inflationart' poIl<:ies, the fal1 :Ln world
Success in
ni- .**.-1.,- prices and the weakness of denand, inflation has eas:ed in all the l{er:rber States.ulrs D ur u65rv
apinst The slor'rd^own j-n the upward price movement has occurl:ed" at differenl; tirnes andinflation 
- 
(t )with Ciffering intensit:r frcm country tc cou-ntrl'\'/" Scme d-efiniie progress
has been rede, in particular in )enmarrc, in the Federal Rcpublic oJl Gerne.ny,
in ltaly and, quite recently, in Ireland. 0n average for the yearo h,-vrever,
the rise in consuner prices for the Cornnrunity as a whcle, estimateil at abcut
I2l 
,4" bettteen l-974 and. I)7,\, willnot change muchl and the range of i.nflation
rates 
- 
between Germany (abcut 6 /" in I9I,t) and. Ireland and the Un:_ted. Kingdom
(about 22-4/") 
- 
wi.ll be wid.er in L975 than i.n 1!l{. Consumer prices for rnanufac-
tured. products have risen less than those for other prcducts and se;rvices,
although i,iage costs per urrit of output in industrl' er,re still ri.si-ng. This
reflects keener competition, but also neans that fir:ms will face fa:lIing profit;
rates j-n intlustry. The r-'rrrlerl;'ing upr,.ard trend cf food"stuff prj_ces ani.
thc naryr increases in public service charges anl pri.ces fcr scrvicgs anl energl-
have limj-tec1 the mod"eration of the rate of increase in the general price Lerrel.
(1) Sec l-ablcs 2 and 4 annexed
IGradual
shi-ft in
eccncmic
yvrru.Y .. .
ana ]-n
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II. ECO]IOJ,IIC POLICY IN 197
2t. In view of the persistence of inflati-on and the slowdom in eccnomic
a.nt irlitrr- the gorreryments of the mer,rber countrres face difficult tlecisi-ons.
0n1.1' l5s .r'edcraf Republi-c of Cerneny and. the ltretherland"s have been able to
c1ear1.irfo1loil/er:frnsionary poli.cies sj-nce the begirtring of 197':. Given the sericr,'sness
of d-onrestic d-isequilibri-a and. external- deficits, most other mer,ber ccuntries
have cn1;'ver1'grarl-ua11y been adjusting thei.r d.e;rrancl n'anagenent policies towards
reflation. Consequently, and also as a result of structural rigidities anrl the
long time-Iags before the rneasures, once tai<en, have begun tc bite, econcmic
polic;r has not shcwn, on the vrhcle, the expectel results.
2.2. Since the aut,rnn of I91 4, -lhe authorities, at first in a n'.:nber 'f
ccuntries an,l then in all the ccr-rntries, have been grad',;alh'mov'ng awa;r frc;m
a restrictive gg!ga1j.g!!g,. lhe first neas'tres ta.<en t: relax nonetarl-
polic;.- viere tlesignei merel;'; tc cffset an incipient slovrdovm in activit;;. I'i
i c nn'trr in -lhn 
^^rrr<a nf I Q7 
', t.hat. morc-l.er,' n,: l i er, 1r:s hec^ma sf o:di l.- mr reeL L/l Pvtrv.r
er:oansionarl'. ?he strengtir of the neasures taken and their timing have rrariecl
between clLrntries: those rr'hich, in vievr of their ra.te cf inflation and iheir
balance t i pavments sit':ation, en jo;*ed thc 5;reatesr scc pe fcr manoeuvrc, tcc :
'.he nost energetic acti.on. Gerrnany l.Jas the first ccul"rl' t. set its pclic:'
':n a frerh crursc. After slac':eiring scnewl'lat, the rate:f grorvth cf the
n'ra'- :'-'rl'- ir ne st iiember Staies has tenled t.- ga.ther m:: enr'lm since theu- i vt r qua'ntitati-ve
sDrin;. Sincc the end cf last year, with the d,emancl fcr creclit fa1li-ng'/restri-c-
ti"cns cn the volume of bank lenCing have either been rela:;ed cr abolisherl altr-
^^+.^^- T1l ^+ ;-+^nt]slrrer est m,tes arer gener?,ll:f speakingr a goocl deal lower than
in the aut''mur of I91 4, orving tc ttre high prcpensit;r to save anci the wea'eless of
d.enanC for funcls from firrns and ind.ividla]s. Since the spring of this:,teart
short-terrn rates have steadilv drifted domruards in the Com;-,unit1r whilst picking
i- ir +ha Trhited States. 'Ihis scissors movement and. the improvement ir-uP @t1@ f rr
the Amerlcan conjunctural situati-on and balance of palments has strengthenecl the
d.o1}ar. Tne currencies in the Itsnaketr had- depreciated against the dol]ar by
a.n averase cf ll 7 at the end of September, compa.red with their best 1evel in the
first half of :1975. Ttre corespond-ing figr,rres for the l-i-re, and sterling are 7 %
and 14 /o resPectivelY.
1Relative
res istance
nf lnno-*orm
int erest
rat es
Budgetar;.'
nal i nt' +r,yv rrvry vv
sustain
deruand.
Pri.ces and
incomes
nn1 i ni ae
a
In general, long-tern i.nterest rates have been slow to imitate the
fal1 j-n short-teryn ratesi indeed,, in a number of Nlenber States, there has
been an actual tendency for them to rise since the sulnn€?. Although the
propensity to save has been exceptionally buoyant, there has been no great
inclination to invest in bon,is. In adclition, the improvement in share prices
which all member countries experienced before the spring has now be,come rather
less assured, with those of some shares even falling sharply during the
sunner.
2.3 tr^lhile, in most lrlenber States, the !g4S, adcpted fcr I97:, were part
of a cautious, even restrictive, policy dictated by the severe di.seqrrilibria in
the economic si.tuation in the aut'uur of 7)'lQ, the actlra.L adroinistra,ti-on cf
the budgets has, d.uring I)l), been redirected so as to support
econonic activity. Gi-ven the conflicting objectives facing therr, the
Ilernber States have, to d.iffering degrees, had to attach increasingly grea,ter
priorit;,' tc safegrarding the evcl of enplo;mrent. 1'hi.s change cf d.irection
in public finance has been cietermined partly by built-in reactions to the Ceteri--
raticn in the economic situation affecting both spendLng (on unenplo;,rrnent bene-
fits, i.n particubr) and ta,a: revenue. llost governments have, hc.r.,'ever, nad.e
several- ad,justrnents to their bud.gets during I91 ) in an attempt tu susiain the
Ievel of effective d,emand-. 'ihus budget d-eficj.ts have sr,rcllen ccnsiclcra'of-r(1).
2.4 The United Kingdon and Den:nark have tc a large extent rescrtec'J- to
i.ncomes policies. In ahiost all the other l{ernber States, price restraint ani
ccmpetition policies have been ad"cpted. Belgium, for instance, has imposed
a selective price freeze, rthile lrance has blocked^ certain nriees:.nd innesod
controls on profit nargj-ns.
(r) See Tbble j an:eexed
l\
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1rr. ouTLooK roR nm EcolioMlc slTuATIoN rN 1976
On what is at present the nost 1ikeIy assr:mption 
- 
that the stimulus
afford.ed by the expansion in world trad.e, the reflationary measures taken by
the public authoritiesr the spontaneous internal factors of recovery and renewed
confid'ence wilL exert a combj.ned impact 
- 
the eccnomy could vrell start to puIl
out of the recession between now and ea,rly I)16. In this case, it would be
reasonable to expect the gross d.omestic prrcd"uct in the Ccmmunity as a whole to
e>;pand- by 3 to *t 6to in real terms in I)16, given that it will have fa1Len by
7=L dr/" in I97 5,
3.2 The validation of this assunption about economic develcpments in the
Comnunity in 1976 rrrilI depend on:
the extent to rrrhich the policies designed. to stimulate the econcnlv will
in fact make an effective contribution to spontaneous expansionary factcrs
and to a recovery in external d-emand;
- 
the speed. of recovery in ind-ustryrs and. consumerst confid"ence in futtrre
eccnomic d.evelopments.
3.3 The strength of the recovery in d-enrand wil-1 depend on the buoyancy of
thu g$g49E1 in the months ahead.. Orowth of around j % in the wlume
cf r'rorld trad.e (volume of imports, excluding Community imports) seems xeasonable
tn I)16, in spite of the deflati.onary impact of the recent IO dp rise in the
price of oi1. An increase of about 6 /" in the imports of the industriali-zed
non-nenber countries (t915, 
-10l") is all the more probabfe since Japan and
the United States have passed the low points of their recessicns and have since
then stead-ily p,ined ground. But there too, there is the danger that a fresh
upsurge in i.nflatj.on will cause economic agents to quickl"y revise their expec--
tations. The demantL for inports in the OPEC countrj-es will continue to grow,
albeit at a less rapid rate (about 2o-2i "/" in 1976) r^ihile the irnport d-enrand-
in state-trad.ing countries will tend, at the very 1east, to settle at a stabre
1eve1.
-lo-
3.4 The prograrnmss to stimufate economic activiti' recently ailopte'J-
E:qpansionary in ltaly, Gerrnany, France, Dennark and the Netherlancl.s should procluce res':rlts
neasures in coming nonths, both in the capiial goods industries and in the cc'nstructj-crr
sector. The results will be all the better insofar as the offi-cieul pro€iramliesj
are rer'lected in orders prnmptly placeC anrl insofar as the cautiotrs approach
to spend.ing adopted bJ'the 1oca1 authorities in certain I'lember S'ates can
be countered. rnore energetica.lly.
\\
Sto ck
-^L.,i 1i; --rsvrrrru1116...
but
haci trnn:r
nr *ho nar*vrr vrre ys4 v
of
househo lcls
arrd, of
firms
cont inues
lhe reconstitution of g!99$ wj,ll also bccst produ,:tionr and this process
seems alreaClr to have gct rueC"er 
"ray in som liember States; lt co'rlC acciir,tlt
for an increase af I /,t cr nore in the gr,:ss nati:nal prcd-r;ct and at the sane
time st ir,rulate i,nports of raw na.terials.
3.) There can be no lasting reccverl.'in the ec')ncrnli uirtil h,tsehcl{sr
nornel propensi.ty to conslme has been restored. Ii,f,woverr as lcng as the
rrrrcertaintj-esaffectingincomcsande:,'p1c:,r--entpc1i.cicspersi-st'!I@
su..piion demand ivj-ll re:.rain oeoressed, while the or ocncitlr t'. sar:e vrill rer.:ain
strong. In crder to bolster confid.ence, it is just as impcrtant t: s-lart
n-,rlrino inflali^n ao i; is *c. b'r'inr" about close co;oeraticn betl'een':nl:n3v ;r v tr16
anJ nzrragement in respect of inc-rnes polic./, cmplo;,'i.rcnt lolic:i ani s::icl
po 1 ictr.
1.6 i.Jith sc mar\y firns running belcw or well belcvt capacit;-t thcrc is
little chance thrt 
.ptjJejgj@ will substanti.ally boost oenand in the
months ahead.
fhe reluctance of nanagements to implenent i.nvestment prograrnrres will probabllr
be overcorne only lrhen there is definite evidence of a recovery in fi-nal denanil
and when the cash si-tuaticn of firms shcns an improveinent, i.e. at a later stage
in the reccvery of the eccnom.v.
ilonn"o-.'
C1
anci later
i mnnnrr.rman*
in the
onn'l nrrar*
situaticn.,
\tI
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3.1 Recovery- of output wil-l'occur at different tines anC r,;ith riifferent
{l}grolrth rates in di-fferent ior-urtries\-/. Tlhe relative neal<ness of these rates
is not surorising, and is due, among other factors to:
- 
pessinisn among the different economic groups causecl by the shoc:{ of the
ahaTnt nr'iqiq ard *-ha nnnqi<*nnao nf tha ronoccier:vr.v4 b.r
- 
d"istcriions and rigidities in the economic system caused by prolonged i-nflati.on;
- 
the r"cakening of imporiani sectcrs rihich 1n the past have been rnotors of
e:ipansion;
- 
the profcrrnd. changes r^rhich have occured. in the intcrnatj.cnal scene.
3.8 In the first instance, the ?ecover.r of erpansion rrill entaj-l an
increase in the nunber cf hours rrcrl<ed. per person enploJred, with less part-tine
'/:crking. ?he nunbers cf g!gff4-94ry.1g!, will prcbably begin tc decline
^r1r, fr.n -li.r-1076 cru,rards. rrcr the average of I)1 6, the nu:.bers -.f perscnsL/ | v
unemplor-eo in the Commr.rnit;' cculf uell increase b;,' half a million ccnpared
r'rith the average for I97";, to reach nearh- ) mi-1lion.
;.9A1thcughthcrecovcr:lis1ike1r-tobes}or,l,thedar:gers"f@
rii11 bc cver-orosent. i{ages a,ni salaries ccrrl-d r'iel1 resocn'l too cgrricl<I;r tc
thc rcc-r'cr-'cf the econom,','. I'lanagements, fcr their part, will be tempted
tc restore profit margins nrcre ra,pid1l,'than in the pa.st. Ia,stly, the upw'ard
movenent in import prices, of law fiEterials for instance, and more particular-
1:.- r,he recent increase in oil prices, are bcund tc affect internal prices.
It is -lirerefore to be feareC that the tempc of the u.p-u;ard- novenent in cr:nsrr.ner
prices i-n tjrc menber cculltries of the Coni.runitl' r.rill be scarcel.'r slcrier tha,n
at prcscnt. A rate cf inflation below 10'r; in the Ctn:unit;r as a whcle
co r1d, ihorefcre, onl;.' be acheiveC through major efforts on the part 'f ncrirber
countries.
(1) See 'iable 2 annexecl
t>
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llorsenine 3.10 1?re Conmunityts g[g[, as that of certain of its
cf cumeit menbers in particular, shculd" begin tc worsen in 19?6. A deterioration in
account the terrns of trad,e is also to be e5pected.
197.6 r'rill be characicrisPd lrw3.11 -'l-tii6tp"iii;ft;;;";i^;fi";' j.nflation in the community and uncer-
l{eakness
^; - 
--- tai.nties about i-nternational econornic relations.
recoverj/ A reappearance of inflatioirary pressures vri.11 qrricl<l]'
threaten the confidence of the varicus economic groups, vri-11 nec;ssitate prenatr-r-re
restriciive policies and 1ead. to a nevr emplolrnent crisis. l.{orecver, the
wea,lgress of the point of departnre, in particular as far as the firra,ncial
position of enterprises ancl tire public sector is concerned, threatens to throttLe
the recovery.
To sum upr the economic situation in the Comnrrnity remains precarious
in 1976.
l+
Necessary
alignrnent
of action
Need- for
bud,getary
policy to
sustain the
recovery
IV. OUIDE"LI]MS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
A. General suidelines
4.t Despite the effor4s of governnents and both sid.es of industry,
the serious d-ifficulties and the dangers confronting the economies of the
Com:nunity countries have by no means been overcome. Ilonever a deep depression
has been avoid.ed.
The increasing d-egree of econonic interd-ependence and the unerpected scale
of the wor1d. recession are pressing reasons for pursui.ng effor"ts to strengthen
econonic coord.ination at Community and international leveIi
[Lri.s coordirration d.oes not mean that the Member States should pursue
identical econornic policies, since both fro; a con-
junctural and a structural poi.nt oflri"orrt1u{!11 differ too widely for
this. However, an alignnent of fundamental objecti.ves seems essential if
what has been a,chieved so far as a Corununity is to be preserwedald.f,urther progress
is to be m'de along the road to European integration.
4.2 In most l,/iember States, budEetarr poLicv wi.ll sti1l need to support
econoraic activity over the coming monthg. In several corurtries, there i-s a
case for heavier overaLl spending by the public authorities in 1976 (volurne).
Similarly a red.uction in direct ta:ration nust be envisaged in rnany cases, if
only to account for soroe or aLl of the effects of tffiscal d.ragrt. The uncer-
tainty about the conjunctural situation requires great flexibility in public
finance policy: while the budget is an eminently suitable instnrment for
checking the clecline in econornic acti.vity, argr over-stimulation of d.omestic
demand or excessive monetary financing might well prod.uce a new bout of
infLation which would cut short a nascent recovery.
rb
ileed. for
a fl.e>;ibl-e
po 1ic;g
ancl coope-
rat ion
anong
ti.iff erent
eccnornic
groups
T4 ^^+i.-:+.- dnps niclc rn srrtrsta.ntia llv- the :rr*hnrities shcffldfr @vu!vfulv uvED yav[ rlr DrruD!@rlurorIJt urls @4Lrrvr
then stabili.ze or scale dcl,yl tb^ir burlget d.eficit during the'rear, nct as
a restri-ctivc 
-oo1i-c;.- brr.t because nc further large-sca1e reflationar;.' neasures
vlould. be needed and be€.use ta:: revenues r.rould start rising again as acti-vity
picked up. Stabilizing cr reducing the Cefici-t woul,l be in l-ine: r^rith the need.
for a ncn-inflationarl' r€coysr". erabling a larger share cf tota1 savings tc be
allocated to meeting the gror.,ring need fcr creclit j-n ihe prj-vate sector. It
should hcrol-l a tightening up :f pubLic finances r.'hici: r,,'i11 in ar1'event be
neeCed rn the Srears tc come.
4.3 T- 'r o7 *La 'in.'1.^- fii.=*oc in opnem l fc llcvled e_inansicnar.r nonetarl-
policies. In r;rcst menber ccrrltries these pclicie:s shoul .l be mai.ntainecl tc
prcvi-de backi-ng for the noveirrent tot"rard.s econcmic; recoverl/. 'ihe1l shciilC,
hntlarrcz'- lro nnn.lrrnted uitTr nnrclcnne so that rrrr ovnoqrirrp oynerqirr - f I ir.'i-
'wvvvrlg4gGr{)L'.\vv.Jr
d i-tv e:-l 'oo prrrri:led rrhen tho nonnrrprrr nf nnira*o..<ontcr trnrrr,urir,q rla'-oh r.ri'i^
nrrhlic troac.rrrr fineneinrn renrrirenentn- sr.rol1c *l'p.larr-,] for cf'erlit.
Also monetary policlr nust avoid er{cessive interesi rate differential.s
vis-d-vis the international market sc as tc prevent d-rsturbing capi.tal ncveirents.
lhese consid.erations lead inevi-tably to the concl.r.rsi-on t]",at clcse cocrrl-ination
is necessary both between the I'lember States and between the Com':unitlr a.n.l tl.l
prj-ncipal non-nember cou.Itries.
4.4 '-fhe most urgent tasli ncw facing the arr-thcriti-es an:i var"ic'rs soci(-
economic groups is to ensure -lhat es.nJrnic reccverl' in the Ccn:-.,.rritl- can ge1;
under ua:"'and that the concl-itions are established rulder trltrch lasting gror'rth
an an impravcment in the employrient situa,tion can be achieved". Industrial
strife or renelled. inflationarl,' patterns of bel:avj-our rroukl undermine the
fragilc foundations of econcmic progress, woulc:- na'l(e the rec:verl.' that :r'-Lch
mcre d-ifficult to achieve, and threaten the emplcrl,Tent sitr:ation.
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.9oopera!,&g betvreen the two sitles of industry ancl the authoritiesR61e . .
oi-ii",o" is the key to aqy revival of confidence in future economic grovrth. But it
cannot be buil-t up unless the d.istribution of the burd-en created by the
econonic difficulties i.s as fair as possible.
With reprd. to fJ.rms, it m,y reaeonably be expectdd that they shou1d
improve their financial situation as a result of progreee in proiluctivity and.
rrr"l'lar use of capacity and that they should show the greatest restraint in tbeir
and. unions
prices policy. Supervision of prices anil a policy of keen competition should
help to limit price lncr€aeea.
If profits and the propensity to invest.are to improve, the unions
rnust show noderati.on in wage dernands and, for a limited peri.od, they nust
forego the Large increases in real income obtained. over recent years, since
these have largely outstrippecl increases in productivity and have 1ed to
a heavy increase in the sha,re of nationaL incone accounted for by ldages. Such
a r{ages policy is, however, conceivabLe onl-y if there is fuller worker parti-
cipation in drawing up economic policy and greater info:mation on economic
developrnent s .
Flnally the authorities nust face the d.ifficult task of eontaining
and the
l"Ori"" budget d.eficits and, at the sa^ne ti-roe, of facilitating not only the econonic
sector recover?'but also the changes needed. in the long terrn, through pra,cticing
a courErgeous social policy a.nd a'n effective employoent policy.
,1
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B. The zuid,elines for Member Countries
In Dennark, the effect on d.omestic d.enand. of the reflationary measures
taken in Septenber and the expected. upturn in external demand" should encourage
a recovery in activity in the coming months. This recoveryr howeverr will
only give rise to a: slorr increa,se in enployment and. the number of unemployed.
The rate of price increases will probablv continue tq faIl.
coul-d. renain high./-Thri expected. development of imirorts ib likely to lead to
a sharp deterioration in the current account of the balance of pa;rments.
The extension of the pay agreements of last spring ha,s contributed. to a
more moderate development in prices and salaries; the strict application of
these agreenents should. nean further progress in this d.irection. The inproved
costs situation could help to stimulate exports in an intensely
competitive situation and to limit the. size of the external d.eficit.
fn this respect, budgetary policy, which has helped. to achieve a
more favourable d.evelopment of incomes, should try to ensure in particular
that the d.eliberate lessening of the fiscal burd.en rrnd.ertaken since the begin-
ning of 1975 should be offset by a slower rate of increase of current
expend"iture which, given a favourable d.evelopment of the econony, should
enable the bud.get d.eficit to be reduced..
Monetary policy should, seek to counter the consequences which could
rise in a peri-od. of economic recovery, from an excessive gr.owth of d.onestic
Iiquid.ity cauged. by a large Government d.eficit. The monetary authorities
should., in ad.d.ition, try to ensure a substantial inflow of capital. Cred.it
policy should aim at preventing the appearance of d,establising factorst
especially in the construction sector.
tg
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The econonic upturra which had been expectedr in the Federal
Republic of Germ,nv, naJslot ocoured ancl availabLe production capacity
oontinued. to inarease up to the sunllt€lr
T[e neasures und.ertaken by the authorities responsib].e for
econonic policy to increase the leveI of eoonomlc activity, the au'aited
the
recovery offr6r1d eoonony, as well as the eventual strengthening of private
consunption and the propensity to invest should. give risel in a short
tine, to a tr:rn-ror:nd. in econonic activity and. a progressive rise in econonic
grow'bh. ITone,theless, a consid.erable neasure of unoertainty still- affects the
hopes placed. on the factors leadjng to an upturn. In the first stages an
expansion of worLd. tra,cl.e wilL not be of great heLp to the Federal Republic
of Ger-m,ny, on the one band. because of the stnrcture of its exports which
are directed. largely towarrls pl,aat and. nachineryr on the other hand as
a result of d.elayecl reactions to excha,nge rate changes which could. possibly
stiLl- influence the Gernan econony. tlnd.er these cond.itions the task
of economic pol-icy wilL be essentislly to support, to the ertent requiredt
the forces of e>pansion in ord.er to attain in ]-i976 a higher rateoLpacity
utiLisation.
3ud.getary policy ehouLd" be f1exibLe. On one ha,nd. it should. continue
in Line with the d.ecisions arrived. at for inproving the structure of the
bucl.get ancl. to contj:rue to linit the butl.get d.eficit in the roed.ium-tern, and
on the other ha,nd, with a vlew to the upturn in econonic activityr it should'
show a d.eficit in L976 sinilar to tbat of 1975. A possibLe short-falI in
tax receipts shoulcl not lead. to new reductions in expenditures in the
short tern; wbere necessaryl supplenentary neasures for supporting tbe
level of activitY should be taken'
!{onetary polioy shoul-al be such as to allow an econonic recovery
while preventing the deveLoprnent of lnfla,tionary tensions. An abundancy
of liquicLity in the econony, and if necessary the acloption of open Prket
pol.icies, shouLtl rnake the fina,ncing of the cleficits easler and inhibit an
unuarranted. rise in Long*term interegt rates.
rx
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The increase ln prices: eight, however, continue to
slow d.own, above all if noderate wage rises ar€ agreed. on at
the nert negotiations wbich wiLL lirnit oosts on enterprises and if
the latter by the help of a better utilisation of capacity, could. bring
about new increases in prod.uctivity.
)O
In France, the recession which the economy has undergone in 1!l) following
a sharp fal1 in dernand, seens to a large ertent to have been brought about by
a severe run-down in stocks. This resulted. from the fact that the business
sector suffered. severe liqrid.itl' problems, as price and employment policies
prevented it from passing on tr.,3ftffia"r.r""f"113"fi"{E?To""tion of the terrns of trade in
19?3 and 1974. The reconstitution of stocks, a process which is beginning,
wi]l bring about a rnarked. recoverJr, but sustained expansion reguires that the
other ccmponents of derand., notably pri-vate fixed. investment, react favorably to this
yearrs stimulatory measures and" irnproved. prospects for the future. However
unemplo.r,rnent wil-l certainl;r remain high throughout most of 1976. The commercial-
balance which will show a substantial surplus in 1975 will probably be close to
eqrilibriun next year.
The d"epth of the recession has made it easier to curtail inflation.
As the economy starts to expand and. since raw rnaterial prices are now increasingt
i,t wj-1l prove extremely d-ifficult to effect a further out in the ruonthly
rate of price increases. Certainly the high iuage rate increases of the flrst
half of this year, as well as the rises in employers social security contribu-
tions have yet to be ful1y reflected' in r'tholesale prices.
If the economic expansion is sustained through the course of 1976 the
budget c1eficit, which in terms of execution will be close on 40 billion francs
in L9I), should. be limited. But given that certain erpenditures decided upon
in the l9?5 expansionary programs will not be effected. till nert year a certain
i.eficit will occut tn 1976. Sesideq in ord,er to ensure that recovery is
sustained it nay be necessary to take further measures with budgetary irnplications.
Monetary policy has not been restrictive during the recession. Ceilings
on bank lending have not been reached". The rnoney supply in I9l) has risen
at a higher rate than SOP i-n value terms. Interest rates have tend.ed to fa1l
substantially. In 1976 developments in the monetary aggregates should be
watched. closely to avoid any appearance of inflationary pressures later in the
V€&f o
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In l_reland recovery could occur nrithin the next few nonthsr but
that recovery wiIL be slow until the world economic situationr and particu-
Iarly that of the United. Kingd.om, gives it greater inpetus. fhe enplolment
position will renain worrying and unemplo;rnent will stay at a high level.
The inflation rate will continue to slow dov,,n. The cument balance of
paynents wiIl inprove before the recovery beconeg fully established..
Policy on incones will play the most iuporta.nt role in consolid.ating
the preeent tend.ency towards a slowd.own in the rate of inflationrby reducing
cost increases, which threaten the competitive position of frish good.s. To
achieve this it is not suffioient to institute an autonatic link between
prices and. uages.Liuuitations on incomes growth and spread.ing that growth over
time should" be inplemented. for all social groups.
Budgetary policy in 1976 need.s to restlajn .the growth of public consump-
tion and arroid excessive increases in private consusrption. This implies that
the net borrow'ing requirement be brought d.own to consid.erably below the 1l f"
of the gross d.onestic product which it will certainly reach Ln 1975.
Monetary policy should. be prudent, particulalty during the recovery
period,, so as to avoid. alJ.owing the growbh in internal liguicLity, which results
from the increase in the finance needed. by the public sector in the last two
years, to raise new inflationary pressures. Drrring this period., the authori-
ties should also aim at the builcling up of the necessary resources for financing
productive investment in the private sector.
DL
In &1;, the consiclerable a.og!'ess achieved since the encl of 1974
toward-s restoring external ancL internal equilibrir:m has been accorcpanied- by
a very narked economie recession. flhe authorities have found. themsel-ves required
to stimula.te aotivity through an easy money policy and even more so through
bud.getary measures. But econonio expansion will only becorne nore rapid- when
world trad.e recovers a"nd. when the settlement of the agreements with the tratle
unions in the auturnn has eliminated. the r:ncertainty about thenr particularly
insofar as the prcfitability of oonopanies is concerned'
fn this context the government should cl-o all it can to speed. up the
implementation of the expansiona,ry measuresr especially given the fact that
d,elays could. endanger a balancecL growbh in the near futu.:'e. Bud.Setary policy
shoul6 aim at eliminating rigid.ities in public expend.iture and in augmenting
ta:c receipts as far as necessary to meet the reguirements of the infra-
structure and. public services. In this'respect tightening controls to reduce
tax evasion should become a prine goal. Besid.es a greater flexibility in
a.nticyclical measures should be sought, particularly through simplifying admini-
strative proceduresr by speed.ing up the implenentation of state-financed-
investment programmes, and if necessary by moclifying the curent legislation.
Moreover, there is some danger that the continuance in the uned.ir.m term of
a high current accor:nt d.eficit nright lead. to serious problems in financing
investment and then to an unfavourable impact on internal and. external equi-
libriuml and. so lead. to a stop-go cycle which can only have serious inplications.
Monetary policy, in reducing interest ratesrwill rightly he1p to lncrease
the demand, for creclit by the private sector. However such a policy needs to
be irnplemented. oarefully in order not to upset the attractiveness of the
Italian capital rrarket for foreign investors and to reduce the balance of
pa;rments constraint. Moreover, the balance of palments could be threatened
by speculative purchases occasioned. by the economic recovery and' the rising
prices of raw materials. In the near future the monetary authorities nust
show prud.ehcel particularly in appreciating the reaL need's of the econoqy in
so far as cred.it is concerrred.
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rn the Nptherlands considerable support has been and is sti11
being given to d.onestic d.emand., In the framework of the bud.get for L9?6
the governnent has further reinforced- its reflationary policy. Accord.ing
to the d.raft bud.get, the net borrowing requirement of the State should" reach
Fl 14r100 nilIion, including the anortisation of the national de'bt.
Despite the strongly expansionary stance of bud.getary policy, the
enploSrment situation is unLikely to improve noticeably nert year. fndeed,
even if the erpected- recovery in foreign d.erm,nd. vrere to becone evident very
soonr it couLd. not have rauch influence on unernplo;rment until after a rela-
tively i-ong tine-Iag. fhe reabsorption of structuraL unenplolnnent requires
a global effort as well as selective action.
fhe outlook for the d.evelopnent of prices and vnage costs in 1976
is not reassuring, although it appears more favourabLe than in 1975.
Und'oubted-ly the prospect of sone ad"rrances in prod.uctivity allows a more
grad'ual d"evelopment i:e wage costs per unit of output to be hoped. for, and.
the governnentrs decision not to raise the existing social security
contribution rates constitutes, from here oasard.s, a najor contribution
to hold.ing back inflation. But it is important that this measure shoul-d
be accornpained. by a paral1e1 effort fron both sid.es of ind.ustry to
nnod"erate the rise in noninal incomes and. attempt to reach the objective
proposed. by the gpvemlnent (an i-ncrease of 1ess than 1O /" in salaries).
Monetary policy will play an especially irnporbant part in l)16,
Given tbat f inancing the bud.get d.ef icit in I97 6 through ned.ium and long-
terrn borrowing could" present some problems, a resort to short-terrn method.s
of financing cannot be avoid-ed,; this courd. moreover heLp in keeping
i-nterest rrates at a relatlvely Iow level.
a+
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In Belgirrn the recovery 1n activity could. be d.elayed. conpared with the
inprovenent in the economic situation expected. for Selgiunrs nain trading
partners.
After having been restrictive last year, economic policy has been eased.
since the beginning of L975. As for bud.geta.ry mattersr the d.ecision by
the Belgian Government to advance the starting d.ates of public investnent
prograrnmes will have its impact chiefly in L976. In add.ition, the rate of
growbh of tax receipts will be distinctly lorarcr than during L975, a year
in which the cor:nter-inflationary policy was started, based. partly on in'
creased. taxation. [hese two factors alone are likely to cause a sizeable
incr-ease in the borrowing 
""q*f""tr"J#f7."tf";fSttJ+""Fs, given the cument
short-teru outlook for the economy, some further action, consisting essen-
tially of a red.uction in the burden of income-tarr a.ndr if need. bet some en-
courc,gement for resid.ential constnrction, particularly as regards guants fcr hcrr-
sing and. housing irnprovement, seems appropriate. It is, however, important
that, at the same time, efforts should. continue to be made to mod.erate the
grorrbh of erpenditure a^nd. transfer pa;ments by public adninistrations.
Monetary policy could. play an important rol-e i.n stimulating activityt
through an expansion in lend.ing and. a lowering of interest rates. The
measures easing moneta:qr policy recently taken in neighbouring countries
have opened. the way for sinilar initiatives on the part of the Se1gian
authorities. It wor:Ld. be particularly d.esirable to ensure that the red.uction
in base rates is effectively passed. on to lend.ing rates.
In any case, the enploynent situation could. not
d.own in the rise in wa6e costs. In this contexb
keep strict control of trading profit margins.
inproved without a slowi.ng
would. be appropriate to
be
;*lu
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-LuxcmbourE household and public sector d.enand could continue to grow at a
rclatively high rate, while exports, especially of iron and steelr 8F likely
to rccover only gradrrally und.er the influence of the expected. fi:rning in foreign
d.erna'nd. The construction industry, for which the declinc in 19?5 has bcen some-
what lessened by the cxpanslon in public works, will renain vcry d.epreescd. in
1976, nainly because of the persistent weakness in the housing sector. Thc
state d.cficit (net bomowing rcquirenent)u should :rcmain substantial in 1976.
Ind'eed. the cost of the measures nced.ed to ncutralizc the effects of the worsening
in enplotrrmcnt will remain high, whi.Lc thc yicld. frorn direct taxation ard.in
particular from taxes on companies wiLl scarcely increase.
Since the leve1 of ernployment and of gencral activity are to a large extcnt
deterrnined. by the trend in cxports, cconomS.c policy should fron now on aim at
scLective support for the private sector.
-2\-
In the course ot L)lJ, the ccononic rccesgion in thc ]igiigAl$@gg proved to be
deeper, and. couLd. well last Longer, than officiaLly expcctcd. at the time of the
Spring Bndgpt. The volune of consuncrsr crpend^iturc was increasingS.y affectcd
by the contraction of real personal disposabLe incorne. Private industrial in-
vestnent, in both fixcd. assets a,ncl stocks, fel1 sharply. The buoyancy of public
cxpend.iturc, combincd. with a nct movencnt of resources into thc balance of pay-
nents, howevcr, ser:ved to linit the faII in overal1 d.cnand. trcvcrthclcssr un-
enploSrmcnt clinbcd to a ncw post-war rccord. level and. the rate of inflation rc-
mained. very high clcspite sonc recent signs of inprovement. Although the cuFcnt
account of thc balance of paSrments improved. dranatically during thc first half
of I)IJ, some d,cterioration has rccently occumed..
Domestic demand. and output are unlikely to show strong signs of recovery before
thc spring of L975 whcn inflation is cxpected to havc noderated significantlyt
J.cad.ing to a rcversaL of thc prcscnt trend. in consunersf cxpend.iture and a
strcngthening of business confid.ence. The stimulus from public expcndituret
howevcr, is then cxpected to sLacken as the cuts announced. in the April hrd'gct
coroe into cffect.
Dcspitc thc unsatisfactory prospects for output and employrnent, there will bc
limlted scope for reflationary measures so long as the rate of inflation remains
unduly high. Evcry cffort should thercforc be madc to engurc that the 0overnementb
countcr-inflation policy, as outlined in thc JuIy Mrite Paper, is strictly
inpLencntcd.
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The behaviour of the exterual balance cou.ld. also constitutc a constraint on
the authoritiest xoom for manoeuv!€o Should the stinulus arising from the
expected upturn of world trade be delrycd., filndamental changes of policy,
includ.ing gencral reflation, should be avoided and action confined to measures
of a linited. nature dcsigned to alleviate the most serious d*fficnrLties.
fn order to reverse the present trend towards a rapid. expansion of the pirblic
sector bomowing requirement, the authorities should., from the bcginning of the
1976/17 fiscal year, considerable reduce the ratc of growth of public expcnditure
so as to achieve a rate below that projected for thc nominal increasc in gross
domestic product. To this end, it is particularly important that thc new pay
limit be strictly obserwed in the entire public sector, includ"ing the natior:alised
j-ndustries. This budgetary policy should be continucd. during the cxpccted" period.
of recovery so that the size of the red.uction of the bonowing requirenent is
increased as the upswing gpthers momentun.
The present position with regard to nonetary policy should be maintaincd. in 1976,
and the rate of expansion in noney supply should remain below the target ratc of
inflation set out in the July White Paper. This should be conplenented. by a
policy of laintaining sufficiently hig'h level-s of short-tern interest rates to
encourage ordcrly capital movements appropriate to thc U.K. balance of payments.
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CONC[;USIONS
fn the light of infornation arrailable at the beginning of
October it appears that the recession has bottomed. out inFrancerthdFec1eral
Republic of Germargr and Dennark and. is nearly at alr end in the majority
of the other Member States.
If, in the course of the coming months, trend"s toward-s the
replacement of stocks, a recovery in external d.emand and a norrnalisation
of consumer expend.iture are confirmed" and become generalised, a moderate
growth of gross comm:nity product in real terms during 1!J6 seems
probable. Nevertheless, industrial capacity will not necessarily be
fully utilisett and the employment situation will only improve grad,uaLly.
Given the uncertainties which exist as to the behaviour of
economic agentsr one can scarcely be sure of the amplitud'e or d'uration of
the expected- economic recovery. Therefore it will be necessarY to
foltow very carefully the subsequent development of the conjunctural
situation within the framework of frequent consultations and close
coord.ination between Member States.
The Comnunity should not in the immed.i-ate future count too ruch
on a boost to economic activity from third. countries. Its weight in
international trade forces the Comnunity itself to contribute to the
recovery in the world conjr:nctural situation. A similar responsabili.ty
falls on Member States in the Comrnrnity context.
- 
This Decision is addressed. to the Member States.
-t'1-
ANNEX
TAStES
l. Developnent of industrial production.
2. Changes in the principal tnac"o-econonic aggrege.tes of the Conrnunityt
The United States and JaPan.
3. Unemplo5nnent ratio.
4, Changes in consr:mer prices since 1973'
!. E)rpenditure, receipts a^nd net balance of 0entral Covernnent Budgets.
6. Monetary situation. '
'f 
. Cornmunity trade balarrces.
GRAPIIS
A. Trade axrd. output in the Corununity ald the worLd. since L961.
B. Weighted appreclation of depreciation of the currencies of menber countries
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